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Abstract—Implementations of cryptographic primitives are
vulnerable to physical attacks. While the adversary only
needs to succeed in one out of many attack methods, the
designers have to consider all the known attacks, whenever
applicable to their system, simultaneously. Thus, keeping an
organized, complete and up-to-date table of physical attacks
and countermeasures is of paramount importance to system
designers.
This paper summarizes known physical attacks and counter-
measures on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. Instead of repeating
the details of different attacks, we focus on a systematic way of
organizing and understanding known attacks and countermea-
sures. Three principles of selecting countermeasures to thwart
multiple attacks are given. This paper can be used as a road
map for countermeasure selection in a first design iteration.
Keywords-Side-channel attacks; Elliptic curve Cryptosys-
tems;
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional cryptanalysis assumes that an adversary only
has access to input and output pairs, but has no knowledge
about internal states of the device. However, the advent of
side channel analysis showed that a cryptographic device can
leak critical information. By monitoring the timing, power
consumption, electromagnetic (EM) emission of the device
or by inserting faults, adversaries can gain information about
internal data or operations and extract the key out of the
cryptographic device without mathematically breaking the
primitives.
With new tampering methods and new attacks being
continuously proposed and accumulated, designing a secure
cryptosystem becomes increasingly difficult. While the ad-
versary only needs to succeed in one out of many attack
methods, the designers have to prevent all the applicable
attacks simultaneously. Moreover, countermeasures of one
attack may surprisingly benefit another attack. As a result,
keeping abreast of the most recent developments in the
field of implementation attacks and with the corresponding
countermeasures is a never ending task.
In this paper we provide a systematic overview of
implementation attacks and countermeasures of one spe-
cific cryptographic primitive: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC). However, this paper has no intention to propose
new attacks or new countermeasures. Instead, we describe
several general principles for countermeasure selection. The
survey in this paper can be used as a tool for selecting
countermeasures in a first design iteration.
This survey has been influenced by Avanzi’s report [1]
and the books by Blake et al. [2] and Avanzi et al. [3]. All
of them give an excellent overview of side-channel attacks
on ECC and HECC up to their point of publication. This
paper, however, differs from previous work in at least three
aspects. Firstly, it includes recently reported attacks such as
carry-based attack [4]. Secondly, we focus on the interaction
of known attacks and countermeasures in a systematic way.
Thirdly, this survey proposes some guidelines for selecting
countermeasures. We would like to stress that, just as what
was stressed in previous reports [1]–[3], perfect (fully secure
and low-cost) countermeasures do not exist up to now.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives a short introduction on the background of ECC and
implementation attacks. Section III and IV gives details
on known passive and active attacks on the Elliptic Curve
Scalar Multiplication (ECSM), respectively. In Section V,
we discuss a systematic way to select countermeasures.
Section VI gives some research directions on this topic. We
conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
We give a brief introduction to Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography and implementation attacks in this section. A
comprehensive introduction to ECC can be found in [2], [3].
For a thorough summary of power analysis attacks, by far
the most popular class of implementation attacks, we refer
the reader to [5].
Throughout this paper we assume the notations below are
defined as follows:
• K: a finite field;
• char(K): the characteristic of K;
• E(a1, a2, a3, a4, a6) : an elliptic curve with coefficients
a1, a2, a3, a4, a6;
• P (x, y): a point with coordinates (x, y);
• O: point at infinity;
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• E(K) : a group formed by the points on an elliptic
curve E defined over the finite field K;
• #E: the number of points on the curve E, i.e. the order
of the curve E;
• weak curve: a curve whose order does not have big
prime divisors;
• the order of point P : the smallest integer r such that
rP = O;
• coordinate system: a system to represent a point in an
n-dimensional space;
• affine coordinates: a point is represented with a two-
tuple of numbers (x, y);
• projective coordinates: a point (x, y) is represented as
(X,Y, Z), where x = X/Z, y = Y/Z;
• Jacobian projective coordinates: a point (x, y) is repre-
sented as (X,Y, Z), where x = X/Z2, y = Y/Z3.
A. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
An elliptic curve E over a field K can be defined by a
Weierstrass equation.
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6 (1)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K and Δ = 0. Here Δ is the
discriminant of E. A Weierstrass equation can be simplified
by applying change of coordinates. If char(K) is not equal
to 2 or 3, then E can be transformed to
y2 = x3 + ax + b (2)
where a, b ∈ K. If char(K) = 2, then E can be transformed
to
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (3)
if E is non-supersingular.
For cryptographic use, we are only interested in elliptic
curves over a finite field. Elliptic curves defined over both
prime fields and binary extension fields are used in reality.
Given two points, P (x1, y1) and Q(x2, y2), the sum of P
and Q is again a point on the same curve under the addition
rule. The set of points (x, y) on E together with the point at
infinity form an abelian group. The security of ECC is based
on the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (ECDLP), namely, finding out k for two given
points P and Q such that Q = kP . The variable k is called
the scalar. In most cases the secrecy of k is protected.
B. Scalar Multiplication
A cryptographic device for ECC is supposed to perform
scalar multiplication efficiently and securely.
Given the a point P ∈ E(K) and a scalar k, the
computation kP is called point multiplication or scalar
multiplication. Algorithm 1 shows the Left-To-Right binary
method for scalar multiplication.
Algorithm 1 Left-To-Right (downwards) binary method for
point multiplication
Input: P ∈ E(F) and integer k =∑l−1i=0 ki2i.
Output: kP .
1: R ← O.
2: for i = l − 1 downto 0 do
3: R ← 2R.
4: If ki = 1 then R ← R + P .
5: end for
Return R.
Given two points P1(x1, y1) and P2(x2, y2) on an elliptic
curve E defined over binary extension fields, one can
compute P3(x3, y3) = P1 + P2 as follows:
x3 = λ2 + a1λ− a2 − x1 − x2
y3 = −y1 − (x3 − x1)λ− a1x3 − a3
where
λ =
{
3x21+2a2x1+a4−a1y1
2y1+a1x1+a3
(x1, y1) = (x2, y2),
y1−y2
x1−x2 otherwise.
These formulas use coordinates in affine form, and they
require the division operation. Because the coordinates are
represented as finite-field elements, this division operation
needs to be implemented as an finite-field inversion, a costly
and complex operation. For example, in GF (2163), one
inversion corresponds to 8-10 finite field multiplications
even when using an efficient algorithm such as Itoh-Tsujii
[6].
C. Implementations and Physical attacks
Cryptographic transformations can be implemented in
both software and hardware. While software implementa-
tions, running on general purpose microprocessors, are flex-
ible and can be easily updated, hardware implementations,
either on FPGAs or ASICs, can achieve higher performance.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of an ECC processor. Note
that each component here may refer to different types of
realizations. For example, the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU)
can be a standard ALU of a general purpose processor or
a dedicated field multiplier. The temporary storage can be
a RAM or a register file. A non-volatile memory, e.g. flash
ROM, is normally used to store curve parameters.
An ECSM process starts with loading certain configura-
tions (the definition of the curve, the underlying field, the
coordinate system, the base point P ) and the scalar k. While
the base point P can be read either from the ROM or from
outside, the scalar k is normally stored or generated inside
the chip and should be protected. The output point, Q = kP ,
is not completely visible from outside. For example, El-
Gamal decryption algorithm only returns the x-coordinate
of Q.
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Figure 1: Elliptic curve processor architecture and related physical attacks. (SE = Single Execution, ME = Multiple
Executions, CI = Chosen Input)
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In practice, execution of ECSM leaks information of k in
many ways. Figure 1 also shows various side-channel attacks
on ECSM. We group the diversity of attacks into two main
categories: passive and active attacks. Passive attacks do not
require meddling with the device’s input/outputs or working
environment. Active attacks on the other hand try to induce
and exploit abnormal behavior in the device.
An important criterion to judge the cost of a specific side-
channel attack is how many executions are required to reveal
the complete key stream. In Fig. 1, each attack is tagged with
either SE (Single Execution) or ME (Multiple Executions).
Another important criterion is that some attacks, such as
doubling attack and refined power analysis, require the
freedom of choosing the base point while some do not.
The base point can be fixed or stored internally in some
implementations, which makes attacks with this requirement
significantly harder to mount.
In order to counteract passive side-channel attacks at least
one of the following links has to be removed:
1) The relation between the data or operations inside the
device and the physical leakages (e.g. power traces, EM
radiation traces, timing, etc.).
2) The relation between the hypothetical data and the
actual data calculated in the device.
With respect to power analysis, there are two methods
to achieve this: rendering the power consumption constant
(e.g., using a special logic style [7]) or randomizing the
intermediate data during the scalar multiplication.
In order to counteract fault attacks, two types of meth-
ods are used: error-detection and error-tolerance. The first
method detects faults inserted in the elliptic curve parame-
ters or the point multiplications. If faults are detected, the
execution is aborted. The second method chooses an elliptic
curve such that even if faults are inducted in the scalar
multiplication, the adversary can not derive scalar from the
faulty results. For example, twist-strong curves are error-
tolerant under twist-curve attack.
III. PASSIVE ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
An adversary has a wide range of choice in attack
strategies.
A. Timing Attacks and Simple Side-Channel Analysis
Timing attacks exploit the timing variance with different
inputs [8]. Careless implementations contain a vast number
of sources of timing leakage. For example, timing variations
can be caused by RAM cache or conditional branches.
Although no papers have been published about a practical
timing attack on ECC, many papers do mention the threat
and provide the reader with suitable countermeasures.
Cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to simple
power analysis attacks if the power traces show distinctive
key-dependent patterns [9]. Alg. 1 shows the ”double-and-
add” algorithm for a point multiplication. The value of a key
Algorithm 2 Add-and-double-always point multiplica-
tion [10]
Input: P ∈ E(F) and integer k =∑l−1i=0 ki2i.
Output: kP .
1: R[0] ← O.
2: for i = l − 1 downto 0 do
3: R[0] ← 2R[0], R[1] ← R[0] + P .
4: R[0] ← R[ki].
5: end for
Return R[0].
bit can be revealed if the adversary can tell the difference
between point doubling and point addition from a power
trace.
The double-and-add-always algorithm, introduced in [10],
ensures that the sequence of operations to compute a scalar
multiplication is independent of the value of the secret
scalar through insertion of a dummy point additions. Another
way to prevent simple SCA is making point addition and
doubling indistinguishable. For example, dummy operations
can be added at the field arithmetic level. This has the
advantage of less overhead. On the other hand, the Hamming
weight of the secret scalar might still leak.
Instead of making the group operations indistinguishable,
one can rewrite them as sequences of side-channel atomic
blocks that are indistinguishable for simple SCAs [11].
Implementations based on the Montgomery ladder [12]–
[14], shown as Alg. 3, are protected against timing attacks
and simple SCA since the execution time of the scalar
multiplication is inherently unrelated to the Hamming weight
of the secret scalar.
The last type of countermeasures is the usage of unified
formulae for point doubling and addition [15]. Unified point
addition formulae use a single formula to calculate both the
doubling and the addition, resulting in an single sequence
of operations for both.
B. Template Attacks
A template attack [16] requires access to a fully con-
trollable device, and proceeds on two phases. In the first
phase, the profiling phase, the attacker constructs a precise
Algorithm 3 Montgomery powering ladder [12]
Input: P ∈ E(F) and integer k =∑l−1i=0 ki2i.
Output: kP .
1: R[0] ← P , R[1] ← 2P .
2: for i = l − 2 downto 0 do
3: R[¬ki] ← R[0] + R[1], R[ki] ← 2R[ki].
4: end for
Return R[0].
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model of the wanted signal source, including a charac-
terization of the noise. The second phase comprises the
actual attack. Because of their reliance on data dependencies,
template attacks exploit the so-called differential SCA type
of leakage. The attack assumes that most of the side-channel
information resides in the variance. So far not much research
has been done on template attacks for public key algorithms.
Medwed and Oswald [17] showed the feasibility of this type
of attacks on an implementation of the ECSDA algorithm.
In [18] a template attack on a masked Montgomery ladder
implementation is presented. Template attacks, if feasible,
are a major threat. Neither the double-and-add-always algo-
rithm, nor blinding the scalar or base point resist template
attacks. In fact, only randomizing the coordinates provides
protection.
C. Differential Side-Channel Analysis
Differential side-channel attacks (DPA for differential
power analysis and DEMA for differential electromagnetic
analysis) use statistical techniques to pry the secret infor-
mation out of the measurements [9]. A differential attack
adheres to a fixed working principle: a cryptographic device,
supplied with the fixed secret key k, is sequentially fed with
N input points Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, .., N}. During the encryption
of input Pi under key k, a measurement over time of the
side-channel mi(t) is recorded and stored. The attacker
then chooses an intermediate value of the algorithm which
depends both on the input point Pi and a small part of
the secret key k. For each key candidate k′ for the partial
key and for each input point Pi, the attacker calculates
the intermediate value and transforms it to a hypothetical
leakage value Lk′,i with the aid of a hypothetical leakage
model. For the correct key guess k′ = k there will be a
correlation between the measurements mi(t) and the hypo-
thetical leakages Lk,i at some time instance t. This relation
is uncovered by using statistical distinguishers such as a
difference of means test, Pearson correlation or Spearman’s
rank correlation.
A straightforward countermeasure against differential
SCA is randomizing the intermediate data, thereby rendering
the calculation of the hypothetical leakage values rather
impossible. Coron [10] suggested three countermeasures to
protect against differential SCA attacks:
1) Blinding the private scalar by adding a multiple of #E.
For any random number r and k′ = k+r#E, we have
k′P = kP since (r#E)P = O.
2) Blinding the point P , such that kP becomes k(P +R).
The known value S = kR is subtracted at the end of
the computation.
3) Randomizing the homogeneous projective coordinates
(X,Y, Z) with a random λ = 0 to (λX, λY, λZ). The
random variable λ can be updated in every execution
or after each doubling or addition.
Very similar, Joye and Tymen [19] suggested to make use
of an elliptic curve isomorphism of the fixed curve or of an
isomorphic representation of the field. Ciet and Joye [20]
also suggested several similar randomization methods.
1) Random key splitting: k = k1 + k2 or k = k/rr +
(k mod r) for a random r.
2) Randomized EC isomorphism.
3) Randomized field isomorphism. We refer to the corre-
sponding paper for a detailed explanation [19].
Coron’s first two defense strategies were scrutinized
in [21] and judged weak if implemented as presented. The
latter three countermeasures are broken by an RPA attack
in [22]. (See subsection III-E).
D. Comparative Side-Channel Attacks
Comparative SCA resides between a simple SCA and
a differential SCA. Two portions of the same or different
leakage trace are compared to discover the reuse of values.
The umbrella term was introduced in [23], but the first
reported attack belonging to this category is the doubling
attack. The doubling attack [24] on ECC is an attack
with chosen inputs and has been shown powerful to attack
some classic SPA-protected algorithms such as left-to-right
(downward) double-and-add-always algorithm. The attacker
does not need to tell whether a computation being performed
is a point doubling or addition. More precisely, for two point
doublings (2×t1)P and (2×t2)P , even if the attacker cannot
tell the exact values of t1 or t2, the attacker can still detect
if t1 = t2.
To thwart this attack, blinding techniques can be effective.
Care has to be taken however that neither blinding the base
point or the scalar is applied solely. This has been proven
insecure [24]. Combined use strengthens the security.
E. Refined Power Analysis
A refined side-channel analysis attack (RPA is short for
Refined Power Analysis) directs its attention to the existence
of a point P0 on the elliptic curve E(K) such that one of the
coordinates is 0 in K and P0 = O. Randomized projective
coordinates, randomized EC isomorphisms and randomized
field isomorphisms preserve this specific property of the
point P0. Feeding to a device a point P that leads to a special
point R(0, y) (or R(x, 0)) at step i under the assumption of
some specific key bits will generate exploitable side-channel
leakage [22], [25].
The attack can be thwarted by using either a cofactor
variant of a protocol for points of ”small order” or by using
isogenous curves for points of ”large order”. The zero-value
point attack (ZPA) generalizes this attack [26]: zero value
points in intermediate results are also considered.
F. Carry-based Attack
The carry-based attack [4], reported by Fouque et al., does
not attack the scalar multiplication itself but its countermea-
sures.
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It relies on the carry propagation occurring when long-
integer additions are performed as repeated sub-word ad-
ditions. For instance, on an 8-bit processor, Coron’s first
countermeasure, k′ = k + r′ where r′ = r#E, is normally
performed with repeated 8-bit additions. Let ki and r′i
denote the ith sub-word of k and r′, respectively. Note that
ki is fixed and r′i is random in different executions. The
crucial observation here is that, when adding ki with r′i, the
probability of the carry out c = 1 depends solely on the value
of ki (the carry-in has negligible impact [4]). The adversary
can then monitor the outgoing carry bit of the adder to
estimate the probability of c = 1. With this probability, the
value of ki can be guessed with high confidence.
So far, no countermeasures have been proposed to thwart
this attack.
G. EM Attacks
Most simple/differential analysis attacks and countermea-
sures summed up so far are based on power consumption
leakage. Most often, electromagnetic radiation is considered
as an extension of the power consumption leakage and the
attacks/countermeasures are applied without change [27].
While this approach makes sense in most cases, electromag-
netic radiation measurements can be made locally [4] and as
such circumvent some countermeasures. Specifically crafted
attacks or countermeasures for electromagnetic analysis have
not been published.
IV. FAULT ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
Besides passive side-channel analysis, adversaries can
actively disturb the cryptographic devices and use the er-
roneous output (or not even the output, but the reaction of
the disturbed device) to derive the secret. In order to do so,
the adversary needs to induce faults on the victim device.
Various methods can be used, such as changing one memory
bit with laser or violating setup time with glitches in clock.
The difficulty in inducing a fault depends on its precision,
both in time as well as in location. Random faults change an
operation or a variable at some point during the execution of
a cryptographic algorithm. Precise faults change a specific
bit of a specific variable at a specific instance during the
execution. Clearly, random faults are easier to introduce, and
they are less costly, than precise faults.
In this section, we focus on fault attacks and countermea-
sures on ECSM. General tampering techniques and tamper-
resistance methods will be briefly mentioned. Readers who
are interested in these methods are referred to [28].
We divide fault attacks into three categories, namely,
safe-error based analysis, weak-curve based analysis and
differential fault analysis. Safe-error attacks are based on
the observation that some errors will not change the results.
Weak curve attacks try to move a scalar multiplication
from a strong curve to a weak curve. The differential fault
attacks analyzes the difference between the correct output
and erroneous output to retrieve the scalar bit-by-bit.
A. Safe-error analysis (M-type and C-type)
The concept of safe-error was introduced by Yen and
Joye in [13], [29]. Two types of safe-error are reported: C
safe-error and M safe-error. What makes safe-error analysis
special is that the adversary is not interested in the erroneous
results, but simply the fact that the output is affected or not.
1) C safe-error: The C safe-error makes use of dummy
operations that are introduced to achieve SPA resistance.
Taking the add-and-double-always algorithms (Alg. 2) as an
example, the dummy addition in step 3 makes safe-error
possible. The adversary can induce temporary faults in the
ALU or memory during the dummy point addition. If the
key bit, ki, is 1, then final results will be faulty. Otherwise,
the final results are not affected. The adversary can thus
discover one key bit in one execution.
In order to thwart C safe-error analysis, dummy operations
should be avoided. For example, instead of double-and-add-
always algorithm, Montgomery’s powering ladder should be
used. If for certain reasons dummy operations can not be
avoided, the key stream should be represented randomly in
each point multiplication.
2) M safe-error: While the C safe-error attack explores
the weakness of an algorithm, the M safe-error attack
explores the possible safe-error in an implementation. The
attack was first proposed by Yen and Joye [29] to attack
RSA. However, it also applies to ECSM.
The basic observation of an M safe-error is that faults in
some memory blocks will be cleared. Consider Alg. 3 as an
example. We assume that a fault is inducted to y of R[1]
right after the calculation of λ during the point doubling
in step 3. If ki = 1, then the faults on y will be cleared.
Otherwise, it propagates to the end of the ECSM. By simply
checking whether the result is affected or not, the adversary
can reveal ki.
Joye and Yen [13] proposed a method to prevent this
attack. The idea is to eliminate the possibility of inserting
safe-errors. Using the modified Montgomery powering lad-
der [13], any fault in R[0] or R[1] will be detected regardless
of the value of ki.
B. Weak curve based analysis
In 2000, Biehl et al. [30] described a new type of fault
attack on elliptic curve scalar multiplication. They observed
that a6 was not used in a point multiplication. An imple-
mentation of this algorithm for curve E generates correct
results for any curve E′ that differs from E only in a6:
E′ : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a′6. (4)
Thus, the adversary can cheat an ECC processor with a point
P ′ ∈ E′(F) where E′ is a cryptographically weak curve.
2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) 81
If an ECC processor does not check whether the base
point, P , is a valid point on the specified curve E or
not, the adversary can then choose a point P ′ ∈ E′(K)
and get the result of the scalar multiplication, Q′ = kP ′.
The adversary can then solve DLP in a subgroup of order
rP ′ (the order of P ′) to retrieve kr = k mod rP ′ . This
process can be repeated to generate kr for different r. At
the end, the Chinese Remainder Theorem can be used to
retrieve k. This attack also shows us that not all the fault-
based attacks require expensive equipments or sophisticated
tampering techniques, and that a naive implementation can
be broken with almost negligible cost.
The method of moving a scalar multiplication from a
strong curve E to a weak curve E′ was then extended.
With the help of faults, the adversary makes use of invalid
points [30], invalid curves [31] and twist curves [32] to hit
a weak curve. These methods are described below.
1) Invalid point attacks : The idea of the invalid point
attack is to let the scalar multiplication start with a point P ′
of a weak curve.
If the ECSM is performed without checking the validity of
the base point, then no faults need to be inducted. If the ECC
processor checks the validity of the base point, the adversary
will try to change the point P right after the point validity
check. Note this attack requires fault induction at a specific
timing, thus is much more difficult than the one described
above.
For some applications such as EC El-Gamal or ECDSA,
y2 is not present on the output. In this case, the adver-
sary needs to derive {E′, P ′(x′1, y1),Q′(x′2, y2)} from {E,
P (x1, y1), x′2}. Though it looks difficult, the adversary still
has a non-negligible probability to succeed. Readers who are
interested can find the complete method in [30].
A possible countermeasure, as suggested in [30], [31], is
Point Validation (PV) before and after scalar multiplication.
PV checks if a point lies on an elliptic curve or not. If the
base point or result does not belong to the original curve,
no output should be given.
2) Invalid curve attacks: Ciet and Joye [31] refined
the attack in [30] by loosening the requirements on fault
injection. They show that any unknown faults, including
permanent faults in non-volatile memory or transient faults
caused on the bus, in any curve parameters, including
field representation and curve parameters a1, a2, a3, a4, may
cause information leakage on the scalar k.
Ciet and Joye suggested using error checking codes to
ensure the integrity of curve parameters before scalar mul-
tiplication.
3) Twist curve based FA: In 2008, Fouque et al. [32]
discovered a new way to hit a possibly weak curve, the
quadratic twist curve. They observed that a point multi-
plication routine for some curve E, without using the y-
coordinate, gives correct results for ECSM on its twist
curve E˜. They also noticed that the twist curves of many
cryptographically strong curves are cryptographically weak
(see [32] for details). Eq.5 defines the twist curve of E,
where ε is a quadratic non-residue in Fp.
E˜ : (ε)y2 = x3 + ax + b (5)
For elliptic curves defined over Fp, a random x ∈ Fp cor-
responds to a point on either E or its twist. Since the order
of E and E˜ are close, the probability is approximatively one
half that a random abscissa corresponds to a point on E or
E˜. As a result, the adversary has a probability of one half
to hit a point on E˜ with a random fault on x-coordinate of
P on E.
There are three possible methods to thwart this attack.
The first one is to repeat point validity check during the
scalar multiplication. The second one is to use y-coordinate
all the time. Both methods have some overhead in terms of
computation time and storage. The third one is to choose
twist-secure curves, namely, curves whose twist curve are
also cryptographically strong.
C. Differential FA
The Differential Fault Attack (DFA) uses the difference
between the correct results and the faulty results to deduce
certain bits of the scalar.
1) Biehl-Meyer-Mu¨ller DFA: Biehl et al. [30] reported the
first DFA on an ECSM. We use an right-to-left multiplication
algorithm to describe this attack. Let Qi and Ri denote the
value of Q and R at the end of the ith iteration, respectively.
Let k(i) = k div 2i. Let Q′i be the value of Q if faults have
been induced. The attack reveals k from the Most Significant
Bits (MSB) to the Least Significant Bits (LSB).
1) Run ECSM once and collect the correct result (Qn).
2) Run the ECSM again and induce an one-bit flip on Qi,
where l −m ≤ i < l. We assume that m is small.
3) Note that Qn=Qi+(k(i)2i)P and Q′n=Q
′
i+(k(i)2
i)P .
The adversary then tries all possible k(i) ∈
{0, 1, .., 2m − 1} to generate Qi and Q′i. The correct
value of k(i) will result in a {Qi,Q′i} that have only
one-bit difference.
The attack works for left-to-right multiplication algorithm
as well. It also applies if k is encoded with any other
Algorithm 4 Right-To-Left (upwards) binary method for
point multiplication
Input: P ∈ E(F) and integer k =∑l−1i=0 ki2i.
Output: kP .
1: R ← P , Q ← O.
2: for i = 0 to l − 1 do
3: If ki = 1 then Q ← Q + R.
4: R ← 2R.
5: end for
Return R.
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deterministic codes such as Non-Adjacent-Form (NAF) and
w-NAF. It is also claimed that a fault induced at random
moments during an ECSM is sufficient [30].
To thwart this attack, the validity of the intermediate
results (Qi and Ri in Algorithm 4) should be regularly
checked. Another possible countermeasure is to randomize
the scalar k such that the adversary can does not gain more
bits of k in repeated executions.
2) Sign change FA: In 2006, Blo¨mer et al. [33] proposed
the sign change fault (SCF) attack. It attacks implementa-
tions where scalar is encoded in Non-Adjacent Form (NAF).
When using curves defined over the prime field, the sign
change of a point implies only a sign change of its y-
coordinate. The SCF attack does not force the elliptic curve
operations to leave the original group E(Fp), thus P is
always a valid point.
A straightforward countermeasure against an SCF attack
is to use Montgomery ladder algorithm that does not use
the y-coordinate for computing ECSM (e.g. Montgomery
Scalar Multiplication with Lo´pez-Dahab coordinates [14]).
Another countermeasure presented by Blo¨mer et al. [33] uses
a second elliptic curve whose order is a small prime number
to verify the final results.
V. SELECTION OF COUNTERMEASURES
One can not simply integrate all the countermeasures
discussed above to thwart all attacks. The reasons for this
are manifold. The complexity and extra overhead added
by countermeasures can significantly increase the design
and manufacturing cost. Another important reason is that a
countermeasure against one attack may benefit another one.
Thus, countermeasures should be carefully selected such that
they do not add extra vulnerabilities. In this section, we
discuss the cross relationship between known attacks and
countermeasures.
A. Countermeasures versus Attacks
Table I summarizes the most important attacks and their
countermeasures. The different attacks, grouped into passive
attacks and active attacks are listed column-wise, while each
row represents one specific countermeasure. Let Aj and Ci
denote the attack in the jth column and countermeasure in
the ith row, respectively. The grid (i, j), the cross of the ith
row and the jth column, shows the relation between Aj and
Ci.
•
√
: Ci is an effective countermeasure against Aj .
• ×: Ci is attacked by Aj .
• H: Ci helps Aj .
• ?: Ci might be an effective countermeasure against
Aj , but the relation between Ci and Aj is unclear or
unpublished.
• –: Ci and Aj are irrelevant (Ci is not effective against
Aj).
It is important to make a difference between × and –. Here
× means Ci is attacked by Aj , where – means that the use
of Ci does not affect the effort or result of Aj at all. For
example, scalar randomization using 20-bit random number
is attacked by doubling attack, so we put a × at their cross.
The Montgomery powering ladder is designed to thwart
SPA, and it does not make a DPA attack harder or easier,
so we put a – there.
Below we discuss each countermeasure and its relation
with the listed attacks.
Indistinguishable Point Addition Formulae Indistin-
guishable group operations render a simple SCA impossible,
but only if the underlying field arithmetic is implemented
securely. This is discussed in [36], [37]. This method does
not counteract differential SCA and RPA/ZPA [38].
Double-and-add-always The double-and-add-always al-
gorithm is the main representative of the countermeasures
that use dummy instructions or operations to withstand
simple side-channel attacks.
The algorithm fails against doubling attacks. It does not
remove vulnerabilities to differential SCA attacks. It also
makes C safe-error fault attack possible.
Montgomery Powering Ladder The Montgomery pow-
ering ladder is an algorithm level countermeasure running
in a fixed time without redundant operations, hence it is
SCA resistant. It avoids the usage of dummy instructions
and also resists the normal doubling attack. However, it is
attacked by the relative doubling attack proposed by Yen
et al. [34]. This attack can reveal the relation between two
adjacent secret scalar bits, thereby seriously decreases the
number of key candidates.
With Montgomery powering ladder, y-coordinate is not
necessary during the scalar multiplication, which prevents
sign-change attacks. However, for curves that have weak
twist curves, using Montgomery powering ladder without
y-coordinate is vulnerable to twist curve attacks.
Random scalar split. This countermeasure can resist
DPA/DEMA attacks since it has a random scalar for each
execution. In [24], the authors have already analyzed the
effectiveness of Coron’s first countermeasure against the
doubling attack. If we assume that the scalar k is randomly
split into two full length scalars, the search space is extended
to 281 for a 163-bit k (the birthday paradox applies here).
This is enough to resist the doubling attack. It can also help
to thwart RPA/ZPA if it is used together with base point
randomization [22], [26], [39].
However, this countermeasure is vulnerable to a carry-
based attack if the key is split as follows: choosing a random
number r < #E, and k1 = r, k2 = k − r.
Scalar randomization. With respect to the resistance
against passive SCA, the above analysis of the random scalar
split countermeasure against DPA/DEMA and RPA/ZPA also
applies here. However, as mentioned in [24] the 20-bit
random value for blinding the scalar k is not enough to
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resist the doubling attack.
Like random scalar split, it renders the safe-error and sign-
change attacks more difficult. On the other hand, it is shown
in [4] that the key randomization process, namely, k′ =
k + r#E, leaks the scalar under the carry-based attack.
Base point blinding. For an ECSM, the scalar random-
ization and base point blinding are based on the same idea
of randomizing one component of the point multiplication.
Therefore, their effectiveness against various passive attacks
is similar. It can resist DPA/DEMA as explained in [10].
In [24], the authors conclude that this countermeasure is
still vulnerable to the doubling attack since the point which
blinds P is also doubled at each execution. This counter-
measure makes RPA/ZPA more difficult since it can break
the assumption that the attacker can freely choose the base
point (the base point is blinded).
This countermeasure might make the weak-curve based
attacks more difficult since the attacker does not know the
masking point R. In an attack based on an invalid point,
the adversary needs to find out the faulty points P ′ and
Q′ = kP ′. With the point blinding, it seams to be more
difficult to reveal either P ′ or Q′. However, in the case of
an invalid curve attack, base point blinding does not make
a difference.
Random projective coordinates. This countermeasure
is effective against differential SCA. It fails to resist the RPA
as zero is not effectively randomized. Combination with a
simple SCA countermeasure is essential.
Point validity check. This countermeasure checks if a
certain point is on the authentic curve or not. It is an
effective countermeasure against invalid point attacks. If the
y-coordinate is used, it is also effective against a twist-curve
attack. However, it is not effective against invalid curve
attacks, sign-change attacks and C safe-error attacks.
Curve integrity check. The curve integrity check is to
detect fault injections on curve parameters. Before starting
an ECSM the curve parameters will be read from the
non-volatile memory (possibly on the data bus), which are
vulnerable to permanent or transient faults. So, the integrity
of the curve parameters (including the base point) needs to
be verified using a CRC (cyclic redundancy check) code
before an ECSM execution.
Coherence check. A coherence check verifies the inter-
mediate or final results with respect to a valid pattern. If an
ECSM uses the Montgomery powering ladder, we can use
the fact that the difference between R[0] and R[1] is always
P . This can be used to detect faults during an ECSM [35].
B. Selecting countermeasure.
After analyzing the existing attacks and countermeasures,
a natural question is whether there exists a set of coun-
termeasures that resists all the existing passive and active
attacks. While unified countermeasures to tackle both the
passive and active attacks are attractive, they are very
likely weaker than what is expected. Baek and Vasyltsov
extended Shamir’s trick, which was proposed for RSA-CRT,
to secure ECC from DPA and FA [40]. However, Joye
showed in [41] that a non-negligible portion of faults was
undetected using the unified countermeasure and settings
in [40]. In this section, we describe several principles to
choose countermeasures.
Complete: A complete picture of attacks and countermea-
sures is the perfect base to select countermeasures. As we
pointed out above, an adversary needs to succeed in only
one out of many possible attack methods to win. Keeping
a summary of up-to-date attacks and countermeasures is
important for cryptosystem designers.
Specific: Whenever selecting countermeasures for a cryp-
tosystem, a detailed description of the cryptosystem should
be explicitly defined. A set of countermeasures that can
thwart all known attacks is neither easy to find nor efficient
in terms of area and performance. Within restricted bound-
aries, countermeasure selection is much easier and more
efficient. For example, RPA and comparative SCA assume
that the attacker can choose the base point freely. If an ECC
processor is targeting an application where the base point is
fixed, then an RPA and doubling attack can not apply.
Additive: The selected countermeasures should be addi-
tive. Suppose that we choose countermeasures from Table I,
we could proceed in two steps.
The first step is a column-wise selection. We inspect
each column and select a countermeasure that suffices to
thwart the attack in this column. If we have chosen two
countermeasures, Ca and Cb, and their relation with Aj is
as follows: (a, j) =
√
, (b, j) = ×. In this case, we need to
study whether Ca covers Cb or not. H in the table should
be avoided whenever possible. If eventually we can not get
rid of all the H, extra countermeasures should be added to
cover it.
The second step is to check if the selected countermea-
sures are additive. Using multiple countermeasures simul-
taneously might introduce new vulnerabilities. Thus, we
need to evaluate the selected countermeasures as a new
countermeasure.
VI. OUTLOOK
Though physical security of cryptographic hardware or
software has been intensively studied in the last ten years,
known methods to protect physical attacks are far from
satisfactory. For future research, we believe the following
topics are important to improve our understanding in phys-
ical security of cryptosystems.
• Mathematical model to evaluate the effectiveness of
attacks and countermeasures. For example, an attack
requires certain amount of information leakage to reveal
the scalar, which sets up an upper bound of information
leakage for an effective countermeasure. Models that
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allow a quantitative evaluation of physical information
leakage are still missing.
• A framework to evaluate the effectiveness of a set of
countermeasures. As shown above, multiple counter-
measures are always used together to thwart multiple
attacks. However, the current method for choosing
countermeasures is rather ad-hoc.
• Grids containing ? in Table I. Table I shows that we
only understand a small part of the complete picture,
and many interesting attack-countermeasure pairs have
not been studied yet.
• A higher level approach to secure elliptic curve scalar
multiplication. For example, many attacks are effective
only when the same scalar is used for hundreds of times
with different base points. A slight modification on high
level protocols might prevent those attacks.
• System integration of multiple countermeasures. In
[42], the researchers suggested a combined counter-
measure and discussed the system integration cost. A
perfect countermeasure is probably useless if it is too
complex to implement.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we give a systematic overview of the existing
implementation attacks and countermeasures on ECC. While
we have no intentions to provide new countermeasures,
we do give a complete overview of the wide range of
attacks and the common classes of countermeasures. We
strongly believe that keeping track of the ever evolving
field of implementation attacks is of crucial importance to
a cryptosystem designer. This paper provides a digest of
existing attacks and countermeasures.
Table I can be used for countermeasures selection. We also
plan to keep this work updating in a more open environment
(e.g. an ePrint version of this paper updated once new attacks
and countermeasures are found) and extend it also for other
similar cases, such as cryptographic parings.
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